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Red Scare or Red Herring:
How the “China Initiative” Strategy for Non-Traditional Collectors is Stifling Innovation in the United
States
Bianca T. Tillman *

I.

INTRODUCTION

A.
The Changing Face of Global Innovation
The United States (U.S.) is a consistent leader in global innovation
and scientific discourse.1 Since 2007, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has ranked the U.S. amongst the world’s top ten most
innovative countries, based on both subjective and objective innovative
capacity data.2 In its annual Global Innovation Index (GII),3 the WIPO
aims to recognize the human aspects behind innovations4 that are essential
*
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1
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., THE GLOB. INNOVATION INDEX 2020 xxxii (Sumitra Dutta, Bruno
Lanvin, & Sacha Wunnsch-Vincent eds., 13th ed. 2020), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YF5-5ZLF] [hereinafter “GII 2020”]; see generally About the Global Innovation Index, GLOB. INNOVATION INDEX, https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/about-gii [https://perma.cc/66YQ-NDTW] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020, 2:39 PM) [hereinafter “About GII”].
2
Id.
3
The GII is computed by taking a simple average of the scores in two sub-indices, the Innovation
Input Index and Innovation Output Index, which are composed of five and two pillars respectively.
Each of these pillars describe an attribute of innovation, and comprise up to five indicators, and their
score is calculated by the weighted average method. Five input pillars capture elements of the national economy that enable innovative activities: (1) Institutions, (2) Human capital and research, (3)
Infrastructure, (4) Market sophistication, and (5) Business sophistication. Two output pillars capture
actual evidence of innovation outputs: (6) Knowledge and technology outputs and (7) Creative outputs. Id.
4
Such as work organization practices (ex. monitoring the quality of products or services, monitoring
external/global ideas, the structure of the work organization, collaboration and the degree of team
autonomy or task autonomy), human resource management (ex. recruiting diverse and skilled employees, financial, educational, and professional development incentives for exemplary work), and
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for designing policies aimed at promoting economic development and
richer innovation-prone environments.5 The U.S. not only excels on the
non-technological side of innovation, but also models exemplary scores in
traditional innovation markers, such as research and development (R&D)
expenditures, market sophistication, infrastructure, and creative outputs.6
The WIPO vigorously emphasizes the importance of international
openness and robust knowledge flow for the “development of successful
innovation nations and international innovation networks.”7 Economies
are more innovative when they incorporate a diverse set of scholarly
voices with the ability to speak on an expansive range of social and scientific issues.8 Furthermore, global value chains, bilateral technology agreements,9 and increased international cooperation are essential building
blocks of today’s global innovation networks. By expanding these networks to connect scientists and innovators across the world, countries and
citizens have gained access to important scientific exchanges for the benefit of humankind.10 In March 2020, for example, a virology lab at the
University of Pittsburg collaborated with the Pasteur Institute in Paris and
the Austrian drug company Themis Bioscience on potential advances toward animal vaccine testing for COVID-19.11 With experts scattered all
employee/researcher participation (ex. employee involvement in decision-making and management
consultation with employees). Also known as the “non-technological” side of innovation. Stavroula
Demetriades & Franz Ferdinand Eiffe, Innovative Changes in European Companies, EUROFOUND
20, https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications/report/2017/innovative-changes-in-europeancompanies#tab-01 [https://perma.cc/Z2S6-JH4V] (last updated June 26, 2017).
5
See generally About GII, supra note 1.
6
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., THE GLOB. INNOVATION INDEX 2019 341(Sumitra Dutta, Bruno
Lanvin, & Sacha Wunnsch-Vincent eds., 12th ed. 2019), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_gii_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3AA-MXZQ] [hereinafter “GII 2019”].
7
Id. at 9.
8
Richard B. Freeman, One Ring to Rule Them All? Globalization of Knowledge and Knowledge
Creation, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RSCH. 18 (2013), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19301.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QE3Y-DPB3].
9
Fact Sheet: U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Highlights: 32 Years of Collaboration, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/st-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5GV-58Z3] (last visited Oct 31, 2020,
3:00 PM) [hereinafter “S&T Fact Sheet”].
10
Researchers from around the world have been using free online web servers to distribute their
complete but unpublished manuscripts (known as preprints) in various fields of research like science,
mathematics, and economics, since as early as 1991. See e.g About arXiv, ARXIV
https://arxiv.org/about [https://perma.cc/K4BC-SU3K] (last visited Oct. 31, 2020, 4:25 PM); Instead
of facing lengthy delays in the peer-review process, the open source distribution model allows authors to receive immediate feedback from the academic community, with the average paper receiving hundreds of downloads, comments, tweets, and notes in its first few months. Richard J. Abdill &
Ran Blekhman, Tracking the Popularity and Outcomes of All bioRxiv Preprints, BIORXIV 26-27
(2019), https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/515643v2.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YL2-NZJ5]
(last updated Apr. 2, 2019).
11
Researchers in Pittsburgh, Paris and Vienna Win Grant for COVID-19 Vaccine (Mar. 20, 2020),
https://www.upmc.com/media/news/032020-cepi-grant [https://perma.cc/R76V-3VGW].
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around the world, the globalization of knowledge creation is the inevitable
next step as we look to solve ever more complex problems with increasingly innovative and sophisticated solutions.
In the GII 2019 report, the WIPO voiced concern about increasing
protectionism;12 particularly, “protectionism that impacts technology-intensive sectors and knowledge flows [posing] risks to global innovation
networks and innovation diffusion.”13 While some experts tout the Trump
Administration’s “America First” policy as the greatest protectionist threat
to global trade,14 other political strategies, such as the EU Common Agricultural Policy, Brexit, and Made in China 2025, also evoke WIPO apprehension, as each causes global protectionism to rise. If left uncontained,
these new obstacles to international trade, investment, and workforce mobility could lead to a slowdown of growth in innovation productivity in the
U.S. and globally.15 As more countries develop, gain access to the global
scientific conversation, and welcome international discourse, some experts warn that the Trump Administration’s protectionist policies will
cause students and scholars to take their talent and academic ambitions
elsewhere.16 When we turn fledgling innovators away from the U.S., experts explain that we lose much more than the individuals themselves.
Eventually,
we lose their inventions and innovation, their collaborative input and
their contributions to our communities. In time, we will lose our centers of technical excellence, which will, inevitably, migrate to places
where every talented contributor is welcome. Ultimately, we will lose
not just our status as a global leader, but the very identity that earned
it.17

12

Protectionism refers to government policies that restrict international trade to help domestic industries. Protectionist policies are usually implemented with the goal to improve economic activity
within a domestic economy but can also be implemented for safety or quality concerns. Examples of
protectionist policies include tariffs, quotas, standardization, and government subsidies. Protectionism itself is not inherently problematic, however too much protectionism may result in stagnation of
technological advancements. Protectionism: The Practice of Following Protectionist Trade Policies,
CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/ resources/knowledge/economics/protectionism/ [https://perma.cc/4RHR-HGX4].
13
GII 2019, supra note 6, at xvii.
14
Daniel Ben-Ami, World Trade: Is Protectionism on the Rise?, INV. AND PENSIONS EUROPE (Feb.
2017), https://www.ipe.com/world-trade-is-protectionism-on-the-rise/10017403.article
[https://perma.cc/QKY6-MWWY].
15
Id.
16
In fact, new international student enrollment has been on a steady decline since 2016. Losing Talent 2020: An Economic and Foreign Policy Risk America Can’t Ignore, NAFSA 5 (Mar. 2020),
https://www.nafsa.org/sites/ default/files/media/document/nafsa-losing-talent.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZHW5-8JHK] [hereinafter “NAFSA Losing Talent Report”].
17
Id. at 1.
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In recent years, the U.S. has exhibited especially protectionist behavior in its relationship with China, a country that the U.S has been formally collaborating with for more than 40 years.18 Despite China’s documented instances of economic aggression towards the U.S. and the
world,19 the U.S. was careful to preserve its valuable scientific and research partnerships with the emerging state up until 2018. Some scholars
argue that the U.S.’ status as a leading global innovator could not have
been maintained without the help of its Chinese counterparts.20 A recent
study on the nature of co-publications between the U.S. and China showed
that recent growth in U.S. science and engineering research was dependent
on collaboration with Chinese scholars, whereas China’s total growth in
science and engineering research output would have increased over the
same period regardless of contribution from the U.S.21 Consequently, the
U.S. has more to lose than gain if it chooses to cut ties with China, especially when considered “[f]rom [the] U.S. nation-state perspective, that
views scientific advancement as zero-sum competition with winners and
losers.”22 Even so, the U.S. recently moved forward with a robust protectionist policy, the China Initiative, to aggressively counter China’s “threat
to our ideas, our innovation, and our economic security.”23
B.
More than a Friendly Rivalry
As part of its national security strategy, the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) implemented the “China Initiative” on November 1, 2018,
a “whole-of-government approach” to maintaining the country's military,
technological, and economic edge over China.24 Launched against a backdrop of concern over China’s aggressive economic practices, the China

18

See U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, UNITED STATES – CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COOPERATION, BIENNIAL REP. TO U.S. CONG. (July 2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/197119.pdf [https://perma.cc/WDU6-A8ZA] [hereinafter “SECRETARY OF STATE
S&T COOPERATION REPORT 2012”]; S&T Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
19
See generally White House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, How China’s Economic
Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World
(Jun. 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-ChinaTechnology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf [https://perma.cc/JBC8-D74K] [hereinafter “White House
China Report”].
20
Jenny J. Lee & John P. Haupt, Winners and Losers in US-China Scientific Research Collaborations, 80 HIGHER EDUC. 57 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-019-004647 [https://perma.cc/25E4-STLX].
21
Id. at 9.
22
Id. at 14.
23
Department of Justice, ATTORNEY GENERAL JEFF SESSION’S CHINA INITIATIVE FACT SHEET
(2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1107256/download [https://perma.cc/TLP5-N28S]
[hereinafter “Fact Sheet”].
24
Id.
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Initiative aims to restrict Chinese access to U.S. technology and intellectual property through protectionist legal and policy procedures.25 U.S. and
Chinese intelligence agencies have spied on each other for decades,26 but
in recent years, “China has increased both the scope and the sophistication
of its efforts to steal secrets from the U.S.”27 While the DOJ’s goal to increase safeguards of U.S. military, intelligence, and private sector assets
may be justified, the department’s decision to include non-traditional collectors, like researchers in labs and universities, is worryingly overbroad
and distracting.28
American universities and research institutions have always been
leaders in fostering open and collaborative spaces where academics and
researchers from all over the world come together to solve some of the
world’s greatest challenges. The scientific community asserts that such international collaboration is crucial for the advancement of scientific innovation and breakthroughs. The DOJ’s China Initiative threatens to stifle
these collaborations by intimidating, discouraging, and driving out international researchers, especially those of Chinese origin.
The China Initiative broadens the DOJ’s discretion to investigate
universities and research institutions for instances of academic espionage—that is, stealing American data, information, and ideas from research settings for the benefit of a foreign government.29 Prior to the initiative, academic espionage convictions were challenging to prove because
they required actual intent to share sensitive information and direct evidence of intellectual property theft.30 The China Initiative lessens the evidentiary burden on the DOJ by allowing academic espionage to be implied

25

Id.
See generally, Alexander Holt, A brief history of US-China espionage entanglements, MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Sep. 3, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/09/03/1007609/trade-secrets-china-us-espionage-timeline/
[https://perma.cc/C2PP-HRMK].
27
In 2019, for example, three former U.S. intelligence officers pled guilty to espionage-related
charges involving China, a former General Electric engineer was charged with theft of trade secrets
related to gas and steam turbines, and two Chinese hackers were charged with leading a hacking
group targeting U.S. intellectual property and confidential business information. Mike Giglio,
China’s Spies Are on the Offensive, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/08/inside-us-china-espionage-war/595747/ [https://perma.cc/L3N73N43].
28
Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
29
Erin N. Grubbs, Note, Academic Espionage: Striking the Balance Between Open and Collaborative Universities and Protecting National Security, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 235, 239 (2019).
30
Id. at 257-259.
26
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through a collection of previously dormant or underutilized federal reporting statutes.31 The FBI alleges that a researcher’s failure to accurately report ties to China-based employment, grants, or other funding sources implies that the researcher must be engaging in academic espionage on behalf
of China.32 Since launching the initiative in 2018, the DOJ has charged
various scientists, researchers, and institutions with crimes of wire fraud
for failing to accurately report their financial or academic ties to China.33
This new enforcement strategy has caused upheaval at universities and research institutions as they scramble to comply with these previously ignored reporting rules or abruptly dismiss “suspicious” researchers for fear
of losing crucial federal funding.34
Scholars of Chinese descent have historically struggled for equality in the American academic system,35 but since the turn of the century,
they have experienced an alarming uptick in wrongful accusations of suspicious activity, such as economic espionage.36 The China Initiative has
ramped up this inequity. While threats to national security must be taken
seriously, the U.S. should change the DOJ’s ambiguous and overly broad
China Initiative enforcement strategy to preserve its reputation as a leading
global innovator.
The DOJ’s China Initiative should be analyzed and reformed with
respect to academia for three very important reasons. First, the initiative
was created to preserve the U.S.’ position as a world leader in science and
innovation; however, by alienating scientists of Chinese descent, the initiative puts the U.S. at risk of falling behind other nations who choose to
nurture and protect open lines of international scientific discourse. Trump
31

See e.g. HEA section 117, 20 U.S.C. § 1011f (1965); Notice of Investigation and Record Requests,
84 Fed. Reg. 34,878 (July 18, 2019).
32
David Bowdich, Deputy Director, FBI, Remarks at Texas A&M University Academic Security
and Counter Exploitation Annual Seminar: The Importance of Partnerships in Responding to the
Chinese Economic Espionage Threat to Academia (Mar 4, 2020),
https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-importance-of-partnerships-in-responding-to-the-chineseeconomic-espionage-threat-to-academia [https://perma.cc/N4XL-MJTB].
33
High profile arrests include the chair of Harvard University’s chemistry department, Charles
Lieber, and in “December 2019, the DOJ reached a USD 5.5 million settlement with Van Andel Research Institute to resolve allegations that the institute failed to disclose its receipt of Chinese government grants that funded the work of two of its researchers.” Jack P. DiCanio et al., DOJ’s ‘China
Initiative’ Uses Scheme-to-Defraud Charges for Nondisclosure of Ties to China, SKADDEN (APR.
2, 2020), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/04/dojs-china-initiative
[https://perma.cc/X5XH-S5MP].
34
Id.
35
For a high-level outline of anti-Asian racism in the U.S., see e.g. Adrian De Leon, The Long History of Racism Against Asian Americans in the U.S., PBS (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/the-long-history-of-racism-against-asian-americans-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/Z45JSHC6].
36
Andrew Chongseh Kim, Prosecuting Chinese “Spies”: An Empirical Analysis of the Economic
Espionage Act, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 749, 752 (2018).
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Administration policies, such as “America First,” have made the U.S. a
less attractive destination for aspiring innovators, and the China Initiative
threatens to exacerbate those chilling effects. Second, as a world leader in
scientific research and innovation, the U.S. is often seen as a hub for international knowledge exchange; thus, increased protectionism poses a
great risk to global innovation networks and innovation diffusion. If left
unreformed, these new obstacles to international trade, investment, and
academic mobility will diminish growth in innovation productivity and
diffusion in both the U.S. and across the globe. Lastly, racially oppressive
policies and practices have historically left lasting negative impacts on
American society.37 The China Initiative has potential to permanently
damage the Asian-American community, further proliferating ethnic and
cultural divides in the U.S.
This article examines whether the China Initiative obstructs the
U.S.’ goal of maintaining its status as a leader in global innovation and
scientific discourse. It contends that although the DOJ’s sweeping approach to “non-traditional collectors” is meant to protect the U.S.’ innovative advantage, it stifles innovation by exacerbating existing issues of racial animus and increasing uncertainty for U.S.-based researchers and institutions. Part II documents the evolution of China from an integral partner to a perceived threat to the U.S. in recent decades. Part III defines the
China Initiative and explains why the DOJ’s current wholesale enforcement approach is problematic rather than protective. Part IV analyzes the
negative effects of the China Initiative on academia through the eyes of
institutions, students, administrators, and scholars. These negative effects
vary in size and scale, ranging from subtle declines in international student
enrollment, to administrative backlogs, forced removals, and criminal indictments of scientists and researchers with Chinese ties. Part V recognizes
the importance of the DOJ’s robust China focus but presents alternative
ideas for creating a more nuanced enforcement approach, such as improving the DOJ’s understanding of scientific research, expanding diversity
within the DOJ, and creating programs to address implicit bias and racial
profiling inside the DOJ.

37

See e.g. Kelly Tian, The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and Its Impact on North American Society,
9 UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH JOURNAL FOR THE HUMAN SCIENCES (2010)
https://www.kon.org/urc/v9/tian.html [https://perma.cc/927K-XHS7] (describing how the Chinese
Exclusion Act harmed relations between the Chinese community and Americans).
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THE RISE OF CHINA
A Brief History of China

Mao Zedong was the founding father of the People’s Republic of
China. Amidst the uncertainty following Mao’s death in 1976, Chinese
leaders struggled to find a way to move their country forward.38 Under
Mao, living standards for both rural and urban Chinese deteriorated significantly, resulting in tremendous rates of absolute poverty.39 Decades of
centralized planning and state control of the economy brought much of the
country to its knees, leaving Chinese officials inevitably grasping for a
solution to the country’s social and economic problems.40 At the beginning
of the 1980s, Chinese officials cautiously decided to introduce capitalism
while still maintaining the country’s meticulous authoritarian social structure.41 What followed was over 40 years of explosive economic growth,
taking China from the ranks of a developing nation and emerging market,
to upper-middle income nation and established market, in just a few short
decades.42
This booming economic growth was aided by China’s adoption of
capitalism coinciding with the world’s shift towards globalization, which
perfectly positioned China as an underregulated, inexpensive, and attractive place to build the “world’s factory.”43 Confidence in globalization empowered massive amounts of Western capital and intellectual property to
flow into the emerging Chinese market, but few Western investors recognized the geopolitical significance of this shift at the time.44 Instead, they

38

Megan Specia, Five Takeaways from Our New China Project, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/world/asia/china-rules-takeaways.html
[https://perma.cc/X4UH-Q5T5].
39
Kent Deng, Great Leaps Backward: Poverty Under Mao, LSE RSCH. ONLINE 36-37 (2000),
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/652/ [https://perma.cc/Z8KL-JWSS]. “Absolute poverty” is defined by the
UN as “a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe
drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and information. It depends not only
on income but also on access to social services.” United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Summit for Social Development 1995: WSSD 1995 Agreements: PAWSSD Chapter 2 (Copenhagen: United Nations, 1995), available from https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/world-summit-for-social-development-1995/wssd-1995-agreements/pawssd-chapter2.html [https://perma.cc/VB9X-7D3K].
40
Specia, supra note 38.
41
Id.
42
GII 2019, supra note 6 at xx.
43
Prableen Bajpai, Why China is "The World's Factory,” INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/102214/why-china-worlds-factory.asp [https://perma.cc/D58324W5] (last updated Feb. 13, 2020).
44
Mile Simpson, Globalization Has Created a Chinese Monster, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 26, 2018,
3:13 PM) https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/02/26/globalization-has-created-a-chinese-monster/
[https://perma.cc/J6S5-PABQ].
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praised the economic growth story, and not without good reason: the integration of China into global markets lifted nearly a billion people out of
poverty.45 China’s rapid economic growth remains a testament to the material benefits of removing geopolitical obstructions from the development
of global business.
B.
The United States Opens Up to China
The U.S. and China officially began collaborating in the realm of
science and innovation in 1979, when the countries bilaterally embraced
the U.S.-China Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (S&T
Agreement).46 With periodic renewals spanning the last forty plus years,
the S&T Agreement launched
an era of robust government-to-government science and technology
collaboration[,] …[with] exchanges fostered under the Agreement
[that] advanced cooperative research in a diverse array of fields, including fisheries, earth and atmospheric sciences, basic research in
physics and chemistry, a variety of energy-related areas, agriculture,
civil industrial technology, geology, health, and disaster research.47

Under the S&T Agreement, the U.S. received significant benefit from its
collaborations with Chinese subject matter experts in various areas.
In the realm of agriculture, for example, cooperation between the
U.S. Agricultural Research Service and the Chinese Ministry of Science
and Technology “enhanced U.S. preparedness to control invasive agricultural pest species[,] helped U.S. scientists develop new seed varieties[,]
and [kept domestic] food prices competitive by gaining access to genetic
resources in Chinese collections.”48 The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) further collaborated with Chinese partners to “reduce pollution loads and their impacts on the United States…[while also] improv[ing] Chinese environmental laws, regulations and enforcement.”49
Additionally, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) collaborated with
China in global immunization, epidemiologic training, and biomedical re-

45

Id.; Javier C. Hernández & Quoctrung Bui, The American Dream Is Alive. In China, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/11/18/world/asia/china-social-mobility.html [https://perma.cc/NHV7-AWU9].
46
See generally, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, UNITED STATES – CHINA SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
COOPERATION, BIENNIAL REP. TO U.S. – CHINA ECON. & SEC COMM’N (Dec. 2006), https://20012009.state.gov/documents/organization/96437.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5ZB-TJ5Q].
47
S&T Fact Sheet, supra note 9.
48
SECRETARY OF STATE S&T COOPERATION REPORT 2012, supra note 18, at 2.
49
Id. at 6.
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search resulting in an enhanced “ability to recognize and respond to domestic and global disease outbreaks and by providing opportunities to advance treatment and prevention of diseases that affect Americans.”50
C.

Made in China 2025

At first, China was slow at implementing comprehensive, longterm industrial strategies to safeguard its eventual rise as a global economic superpower.51 In 2015, however, the Chinese government released
its new state-led industrial policy called Made in China 2025, which, according to U.S. experts, “aims to use government subsidies, mobilize stateowned enterprises, and pursue intellectual property acquisition to catch up
with—and then surpass—Western technological prowess in advanced industries.”52 Chinese state officials describe the plan as part of a “‘three
step’ strategy of transforming China into a leading manufacturing power
by the year 2049, which marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of
the People’s Republic of China.”53 By 2019, China became the first middle-income nation to break into the top 15 of WIPO’s Global Innovation
Index,54 indicating that the country’s new policy is likely working.
According to U.S. officials, China’s recent growth has been
achieved “through aggressive acts, policies, and practices that fall outside
of global norms and rules.”55 In some respects, China has been transparent
about these aggressive acts, policies, and practices. A 2018 White House
report found hostile economic commands in Chinese government documents, in Chinese state actor’s behaviors, and in reports produced by various business organizations, think tanks, and government agencies.56 Even
so, the DOJ reports that nearly “80 percent of all economic espionage prosecutions … allege conduct that would benefit the Chinese state, and
50

Id. at 5.
Press Release, White House, Office of Trade & Manufacturing, Policy Report: “How China’s Economic Aggression Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the
World” (June 19, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/office-trade-manufacturing-policy-report-chinas-economic-aggression-threatens-technologies-intellectual-property-unitedstates-world/ [https://perma.cc/ETS8-DUNK].
52
James McBride & Andrew Chatzky, Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global Trade?,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade
[https://perma.cc/YAY7-2DSP] (last updated May 13, 2019); About CFR, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
REL., https://www.cfr.org/about [https://perma.cc/EFC6-EKKF] (last visited Oct 31, 2020, 4:48
PM).
53
‘Made in China 2025’ Plan Issued, STATE COUNCIL PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC CHINA, http://english.www.gov.cn/policies/latest_releases/2015/05/19/content_281475110703534.htm
[https://perma.cc/EQP5-68BQ] (last updated May 19, 2015).
54
GII 2019, supra note 6, at 12. China maintained its rank of 14th in the 2020 GII. See GII 2020, supra note 1, at xxxii.
55
See Press Release, White House, supra note 51.
56
Id.
51
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around 60 percent of all trade secret theft cases … involve some nexus to
China.”57 A 2017 report projected that Chinese theft of U.S. intellectual
property could be costing anywhere from $225 to $600 billion on an annual basis.58 Given the size of China’s economy and the extent of its market-distorting ways, the White House warns that China’s newest wave of
economic aggression threatens to undermine U.S. economic and national
security.59
“Made in China 2025” is not the first illustration of aggressive
Chinese economic policy appearing to compromise U.S. intellectual property rights, violate U.S. privacy norms, or threaten U.S. dominance as the
world’s economic leader.60 In an analysis of charges brought under the
Economic Espionage Act61 (EEA) from 2009-2015, one study found that
62% of defendants charged under the EEA were of Asian Heritage.62 Experts, who support the DOJ, contend that such a high rate of race-specific
prosecutions can only be explained by the fact that Chinese-Americans
and Chinese nationals are the main perpetrators of economic crimes for
the benefit of their home country.63 Made in China 2025 further reinforces
that narrative by “encourag[ing] state subsidies for domestic companies
and forc[ing] technology transfer from foreign companies with the aim of
driving them out of business.”64
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, the Trade Act of 1974, and
other legislation grant the president the power to levy tariffs and other

57

Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Information About the Department of Justice’s China Initiative
and a Compilation of China-Related Prosecutions Since 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related
[https://perma.cc/5237-A8KL] (last updated Oct. 20, 2020).
58
The Report of the Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, INTELL. PROP.
COMM’N 12 (2017), http://ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WXA5-MPBY].
59
White House China Report, supra note 19, at 2.
60
Breaking the Mould: Trump’s China Policy, INST. FOR SEC. & DEV. POL’Y (Feb. 2018),
https://isdp.eu/publication/breaking-mould-trumps-china-policy/ [https://perma.cc/3K4W-3ZA9].
61
The Economic Espionage Act is one of many statutes used by federal prosecutors to convict defendants suspected of espionage. See Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-39 (2006)).
62
Defendants charged under the EEA are alleged to have stolen trade secrets to benefit foreign entities and nations. See Kim, supra note 36, at 753.
63
Arguing that the Chinese government and businesses target people of Chinese descent around the
world and ask them to steal secrets for China, and as a result, Chinese spies are simply more prevalent than spies of other races. John R. Schindler, The Unpleasant Truth About Chinese Espionage,
OBSERVER (Apr. 22, 2016), https://observer.com/2016/04/the-unpleasant-truth-about-chinese-espionage/ [https://perma.cc/GVE7-TFSQ].
64
Lingling Wei, Beijing Drops Contentious ‘Made in China 2025’ Slogan, but Policy Remains,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2019, 9:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-drops-a-policy-the-u-sdislikes-at-least-in-name-11551795370 [https://perma.cc/H232-ZQCB].
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trade measures if he determines it necessary for the country’s national security.65 The Trump Administration and the DOJ developed the China Initiative on these national security grounds, in response to China’s perceived eagerness to obtain economic superiority at all costs. China’s rapid
economic expansion, combined with a record of co-opting Chinese nationals to “get ahead,” raised such an alarm inside the White House that the
Trump Administration felt compelled to react with similar aggression.
III.
A.

LEGAL BACKGROUND
What is the China Initiative?

In November 2018, the DOJ launched the China Initiative with the
specific goal of clamping down on China’s unfair economic policies, including, but not limited to, China’s history of co-opting U.S. intellectual
property.66 The China Initiative is a sweeping federal plan aimed at satisfying the DOJ’s strategic priority of countering Chinese national security
threats, from the illegal export of military- and space-grade technology to
suspicions of stealing U.S. scientific ideas.67
As a basis for launching the China Initiative, the DOJ relied, in
part, on a pair of damning reports outlining the threat to the U.S. posed by
Chinese intellectual property, technology, and innovation policy. In March
2018, an investigative report by the Executive Office of the President concluded that several of China’s trade practices were unreasonable, including
its outbound investment policies and sponsorship of unauthorized computer intrusions.68 The report claimed that “China’s foreign investment restrictions[,] … administrative review, and licensing systems not only exert
65

See generally Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (1962) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991).
66
Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
67
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Chinese National Sentenced to 40 Months in Prison for Conspiring
to Illegally Export Military- and Space-Grade Technology from the United States to China (Oct. 18,
2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-40-months-prison-conspiring-illegally-export-military-and-space [https://perma.cc/6C2M-J2VR]; Christopher L. Nasson et al., DOJ
v. China: Is DOJ Acting as an Instrument of Foreign Policy?, K&L GATES (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.klgates.com/doj-v-china-is-doj-acting-as-an-instrument-of-foreign-policy-10-01-2019/
[https://perma.cc/5P7F-59HE]; see e.g. Ellen Loanes, China Steals U.S. Designs for New Weapons,
and It’s Getting Away with ‘the Greatest Intellectual Property Theft in Human History’, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2019, 12:44 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/esper-warning-china-intellectual-property-theft-greatest-in-history-2019-9 [https://perma.cc/6V6C-GNMQ].
68
Findings of the Investigation into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology
Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, EXEC.
OFF. OF PRESIDENT 42-45 (Mar. 18, 2018), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/BP5K-AQ9Z]. Conduct defined as “unreasonable” if
it “burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.” Id. at 3. Section 301 of The Act defines an “unreasonable”
act, practice, or policy as one that “while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent with, the international legal rights of the United States is otherwise unfair and inequitable.” Id.
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great technology transfer pressures on U.S. companies, but also are substantially more restrictive than those of the U.S. and most other countries.”69 A June 2018 report further outlined “two major strategies and various acts, policies, and practices Chinese industrial policy use[d] in seeking to acquire the intellectual property and technologies of the world.”70
The subsequent investigation warned of deceptive Chinese trade practices,
including the use of state-sanctioned “security reviews” forcing companies
to reveal confidential information as a precondition to doing business in
China.71 The China Initiative empowers a working group of federal prosecutors and investigators with a conglomerate of tools necessary to address
these serious matters.72
The National Security Division (NSD) of the DOJ is responsible
for countering nation-state threats to the country’s critical infrastructure
and private sector.73 The DOJ’s Criminal Division, in turn, is tasked with
“aggressively investigat[ing] Chinese companies and individuals for theft
of trade secrets.”74 Additionally, the China Initiative increases efforts to
protect critical domestic infrastructure against external threats—including
foreign direct investment, supply chain threats, and foreign agents—seeking to influence the American public and policymakers without proper registration.75 The China Initiative is led by the Assistant Attorney General, a
senior Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Executive, five U.S. Attorneys, and several DOJ leaders.76
B.
Why is the China Initiative Problematic?
The original DOJ China Initiative fact sheet grants sweeping discretion to federal agencies tasked with carrying out enforcement across
various industries and focus areas.77 While outlining a list of goals set out
by the department, the fact sheet is void of any instructions regarding how
investigation or enforcement should be carried out to achieve those

69

Id. at 44.
White House China Report, supra note 19, at 20; these strategies were identified as (1) “Acquire
Key Technologies and Intellectual Property From Other Countries, Including the United States[,]”
and (2) “Capture the Emerging High-Technology Industries That Will Drive Future Economic
Growth and Many Advancements in the Defense Industry.”. Id. at 2.
71
Id. at 9.
72
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 57.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
76
Id.
77
Id.
70
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goals.78 By announcing the China Initiative without a clear policy objective or enforcement mechanism, the DOJ has the authority to solve the
Chinese threat by whatever means it deems necessary.
Since launching the China Initiative in 2018, the DOJ has
aggressively use[d] existing authorities, including the False Claims
Act, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), Foreign Agent Registration Act, Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act,
NIH and DOD grant rules, university ethics rules and conflicts of interest policy, and export control laws, to target companies and persons seeking to obtain U.S. companies’ intellectual property and
technology.79

While these sweeping enforcement measures work to produce
high-profile arrests and convictions,80 they also incite anxiety and confusion at universities and research institutes across the country as scholars
and scientists scramble to comply with the new enforcement procedures.81
The American Council on Education’s (ACE) public request for clarification on how to comply with grant rules, ethics rules, and conflicts of interest policies was effectively ignored by the department of education.82 Law
firms who advise academic institutions fear that the “[i]nitiative has targeted professors acting in good faith who just didn’t understand the rules
for applying for government grants.”83 Members of the Chinese-American
academic community feel especially vulnerable, with many living in fear
that their sincerest efforts to comply with U.S. academic rules will be overshadowed by their Chinese ancestry.84

78

Id. at 2.
Dorsey “China Initiative” Task Force, DORSEY, https://www.dorsey.com/-/media/files/china/dorsey-china-initiative-task-force_final.pdf?la=en&hash=A23EED8142206163ECA83769A24E05F1[https://perma.cc/X5YT-FSE3]
(last visited Oct. 31, 2020, 5:00 PM).
80
DiCanio et al., supra note 33.
81
Letter from Terry Hartle, Senior Vice President of ACE, Gov. Rel. & Pub. Aff., to Diane Jones,
Delegated Under Secretary (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Letter-to-Dept-ofEducation-Regarding-Section-117-of-HEA.pdf [https://perma.cc/PA5W-T7PL].
82
See e.g. Id.
83
Betsy Woodruff Swan, Inside DOJ’s Nationwide Effort to Take on China, POLITICO (Apr. 7,
2020), https://www-politico-com.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/www.politico.com/amp/news/2020/04/07/justice-department-china-espionage169653?fbclid=IwAR1JfWB02H_1ZMUrtBfq79mBtnFtpecJ7H-XDfRYVfh6RmysBYuFy8cPXqs,
[https://perma.cc/QR3S-T5SE] (quoting Catherine Pan, partner at Dorsey).
84
Gina Kolta, Vast Dragnet Targets Theft of Biomedical Secrets for China, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/health/china-nih-scientists.html
[https://perma.cc/5JTG-PYRY] (Statement of Mr. Wu: “We can’t tell who is guilty or innocent[] but
look at the actual effect on people of Chinese descent, People are living in fear. It is a question of
impact rather than intent”).
79
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IV.
HOW THE CHINA INITIATIVE AFFECTS ACADEMIA
Two of the China Initiative’s goals specifically implicate college
campuses and research institutes85 as potential targets of Chinese academic
espionage.86 These goals aim to “[(1)] develop an enforcement strategy
concerning non-traditional collectors (e.g., researchers in labs, universities, and the defense industrial base) that are being co[-]opted into transferring technology contrary to U.S. interests; [and (2)] educate colleges
and universities about potential threats to academic freedom and open discourse from influence efforts on campus.”87
During a February 2018 U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee hearing, then FBI Director Christopher Wray described Chinese students—
particularly those in advanced science and mathematics programs—as
“exploiting the very open research and development environment that we
have, which we [the U.S. society] all revere.”88 Wray further implicated
professors and scientists of Chinese origin as the type of non-traditional
collectors who threaten to co-opt U.S. innovation for the Chinese government.89 While not the first federal scheme to target a specific racial minority group in the name of national security,90 the China Initiative’s methods
for achieving its goals lack the nuance required to avoid discriminatory or
xenophobic outcomes. The hostile environment created by the China Initiative is contributing to a decline in international student enrollment
across the U.S., and many Chinese-American students have expressed fear
and concern about their overall safety.91 The enforcement of previously
dormant or underutilized federal reporting statutes in the name of academic espionage is overloading university administrations and threatening
to diminish U.S. research funding pathways.92 Furthermore, the broad
reach of the DOJ’s enforcement power exacerbates the issue of national

85

Fact Sheet, supra note 23.
Academic espionage is defined as the complex practices of using “non-traditional collectors” like
students and professors to gather intelligence information, in the form of trade secrets and technological advancements, from universities or other advanced research settings. Grubbs, supra note 28, at
235 (2019).
87
Fact Sheet, supra note 23, at 2.
88
See Press Release, White House, supra note 51, at 14.
89
Id.
90
See e.g. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, (1944), overruled by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S.
Ct. 2392 (2018).
91
Elizabeth Redden, A Welcome Message, or a Warning? INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 31, 2019),
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/07/31/state-departments-top-education-official-sayschinese-students-are-welcome-%E2%80%A6 [https://perma.cc/LJU2-3PDS].
92
Memorandum from Ted Mitchell, President of ACE, to Stephanie Valentine, PRA Coordinator
(Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Comments-Memo-Sec-117.pdf
[https://perma.cc/39VR-C9LE].
86
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security scapegoating experienced by visiting Chinese scholars and American citizens of Asian descent.93
A.

The China Initiative’s Effects on Universities and Research
Institutions
1.

Decline in International Student Enrollment

In May 2019, the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers (NAFSA)94 reported that new international student enrollment was
down 6.6%, double the decrease from 2018.95 This sharp decline is partly
due to the shrinking size of many countries’ college-age cohorts,96 but
troubling U.S. policy changes and anti-immigrant rhetoric continue to
worsen the problem.97 The China Initiative exacerbates the negative perception of the U.S. as an academic destination by creating an increasingly
hostile environment for aspiring scholars of Asian heritage.
Since the 1990s, China has been a substantial pipeline for international student enrollment in American colleges and universities.98 Therefore, the DOJ’s heightened scrutiny of students of Chinese descent could
dramatically affect international student enrollment across U.S. college
and university campuses that depend on international diversity to prepare
students for an increasingly globalized world.99 Moreover, while it may be
“shortsighted to think of this issue solely in terms of revenue: international
students studying at U.S. colleges and universities …contribute[d] $39 billion and support[ed] more than 455,000 jobs [in] the U.S. economy during

93

Homepage for End National Security Scapegoating, END NAT’L SEC. SCAPEGOATING, http://endnationalsecurityscapegoating.org/#home [https://perma.cc/F3AP-GG7Y] [hereinafter “END NAT’L
SEC. SCAPEGOATING”].
94
NAFSA Losing Talent Report, supra note 16.
95
Id. at 2.
96
Countries like Japan and South Korea have simply started having fewer children, meaning they
have fewer college-age students to send abroad. Justin Fox, Opinion, The International Student
Slump Isn’t Just About Trump, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-08-21/why-fewer-international-students-are-choosing-u-s-colleges
[https://perma.cc/H8FS-G9NF].
97
These policy changes include increases to international student visa application fees, new ways to
punish students who violate the conditions of their visas, and intense scrutiny over permit programs
that enable students to work in the U.S. after graduation. Marnette Federis, Visa Rules are Restricting the Future of International Students in the U.S., WORLD (June 20, 2019),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-06-20/visa-rules-are-restricting-future-international-students-us
[https://perma.cc/HK4E-WYSX].
98
Nick Anderson et al., Universities Worry About Potential Loss of Chinese Students, WASH. POST
(June 3, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/universities-worry-about-potentialloss-of-chinese-students/2019/06/03/567044ea-861b-11e9-98c1-e945ae5db8fb_story.html
[https://perma.cc/BUH8-Z56N].
99
Id.
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the 2017–2018 academic year.”100 The U.S. cannot afford to close the
pipeline of talent and tuition that supports its education system and drives
its economy forward.
International students cite the tenuous sociopolitical environment
and the general feeling of unwelcomeness as key factors precluding them
from pursuing an education in the U.S.101 Potential college and university
students also cite a significant increase in concerns about physical safety
in the U.S., including gun violence and civil unrest.102 For students of Chinese descent, the increased risk of racial profiling both on campus and in
American society has caused them to look to other countries—such as
Canada, Australia, or India—where they feel they can study in a more welcoming and less hostile environment.103 Furthermore, since June 2018, the
state department has shortened the visa length for Chinese graduate students studying in sensitive research fields from five years to one year, with
the chance to reapply annually.104 This added hurdle means that some students must fly back to China once a year, even if their graduate program
is multi-year, risking denial partway through completion of their academic
studies. The China Initiative further deteriorates the U.S.’ educational environment at a time when international students are already starting to
choose other countries in which to pursue their academic aspirations. Chinese students faced with unstable policies and an unsafe environment are
likely to take their talent, ideas, and tuition dollars to places like Canada,
Australia, or India, ultimately diminishing the U.S.’ potential as a future
hub for innovation.
2.

Sudden Enforcement of Section 117 of the HEA: Disclosure of
Foreign Gifts
The China Initiative prompted the DOJ to begin using various administrative rules or statutes to infer academic espionage from a failure to
comply with laws that had neither a clear guide for compliance nor a history of enforcement in the last few decades.105 Section 117 of the Higher
Education Act of 1965106 is one such formerly dormant statute. The Higher
Education Act (HEA) was signed into U.S. law on November 8, 1965, as
100

NAFSA Losing Talent Report, supra note 16, at 4.
Id. at 6.
102
Id. at 8.
103
Id. at 7.
104
Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Visa Restrictions for Chinese Students Alarm Academia, N.Y. TIMES
(Jul. 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/us/politics/visa-restrictions-chinese-students.html [https://perma.cc/ML2F-KUKM].
105
Letter from Terry Hartle to Diane Jones, supra note 81.
106
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified as 20 U.S.C. §
1011f).
101
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part of President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society domestic agenda.107 The
HEA's intention was "to strengthen the educational resources of our colleges and universities and to provide financial assistance for students in
postsecondary and higher education."108 It increased federal money given
to universities, created scholarships, gave students low-interest loans, and
established a National Teachers Corps.109
Section 117 of the HEA was part of the act’s reauthorization in
1986 to deal specifically with the disclosure of foreign gift; however, the
statute has been largely ignored by the U.S. Department of Education
(DOE) and other federal policymakers since its enactment.110 The statute
provides that an institution must file an annual disclosure report with the
Secretary of Education if it “receives a gift from or enters into a contract
with a foreign source, the value of which is $250,000 or more…within a
calendar year.”111 Each report must contain, at minimum, the “aggregate
amount of such gifts and contracts received,” with additional content requirements depending on the nature of or restrictions on the gift.112 Although Congress codified section 117 of the HEA more than thirty years
ago, the DOE never issued accompanying regulations.113 In order to comply, universities relied solely on two “Dear Colleague” letters, one issued
in 1995 and the other in 2004, that vaguely outline the section 117 requirements.114 The DOE later rescinded the 2004 letter and, on June 22, 2020,
107

Lyndon B. Johnson, President, United States, Remarks at Southwest Texas State College Upon
Signing the Higher Education Act of 1965 (Nov. 8, 1965), available at https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/remarks-southwest-texas-state-college-upon-signing-the-higher-education-act-1965 [https://perma.cc/Y9UN-XNE9] (last visited Nov. 5, 2020, 9:03 PM).
108
Higher Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1219 (1965).
109
Id. §§ 101-105.
110
20 U.S.C. § 1011f (1998); The Department has never issued any regulations implementing the
statute, instead only issuing two so-called “Dear Colleague” letters in 1995 and 2004 which provide
limited guidance about how institutions are to comply with the law. For decades, the reported data
was not even readily accessible, until the Department, through the Federal Student Aid office, starting posting it on a downloadable spreadsheet in 2019. ACE Government Relations, SECTION 117 OF
THE HIGHER EDUCATION ACT FOREIGN GIFT AND CONTRACT REPORTING: BACKGROUND AND
SUMMARY OF ISSUES OF CONCERN 1 (2019). https://www.acenet.edu/Documents/Summary-Sec-117and-ED-comment-request.pdf [https://perma.cc/P79A-7DC6].
111
20 U.S.C. § 1011f(a) (1998).
112
See e.g., Id. § 1011f (c) (requiring additional disclosures for restricted and conditional gifts).
113
Letter from Terry Hartle to Diane Joes, supra note 81.
114
Dep’t of Educ. DCLID GEN-95-12 (Feb. 1, 1995)
https://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/doc0158_bodyoftext.htm [https://perma.cc/XTM2-59PY]; Dep’t of
Educ. DCLID GEN-04-11 (Oct. 4, 2004) https://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/ GEN0411.html
[https://perma.cc/GKN9-5BM4]; A “Dear Colleague” letter is a guidance document issued by a federal agency that helps explain and interpret existing laws and regulations. These letters are non-binding, but they are meant to provide helpful guidance in interpreting existing laws by indicating how a
particular agency will enforce its own laws or rules. Christy Reese, What are “Dear Colleague” Letters, and Why are They Important? FACTOREGON, Dec. 21, 2016, https://factoregon.org/dear-colleague-letters/ [https://perma.cc/X6BV-Q62J ].
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launched an online compliance portal through which institutions are now
required to report foreign gifts and contracts.115
Under the China Initiative, the DOE filed a new Information Collection Request (ICR) to obtain information about foreign research funding under section 117.116 This new ICR is problematic because it originates
from a vague statute and creates unnecessary administrative burdens, undermines relationships, and restricts foreign investment into U.S. based
initiatives. The ACE and twenty-nine other higher education organizations
drafted a letter117 to the DOE arguing that the scope of the proposed ICR
goes beyond the scope of section 117. The group argued that “aspects of
the proposed information collection would go far beyond the plain language of section 117, clearly directing institutions to make disclosures—
with no statutory basis—of a vastly expanded amount of information and
documents.”118 The group further suggested that “the manner in which
other aspects of the proposed information collection is organized and written makes the information collection subject to differing reasonable interpretations, with some of those interpretations also well beyond what [section] 117 requires.”119 International donors are a key source of capital behind the important research and innovation occurring inside American institutions. By alienating foreign donors or exceedingly disrupting the flow
of foreign funds into U.S. schools, the U.S. will have fewer resources to
maintain its status as an innovation leader.
The DOE’s new ICR expects institutions to identify individual
foreign donors by name and address, raising concerns about the loss of
“anonymous gifts from foreign individuals…which is likely to have a
chilling effect on the willingness of such donors to make charitable contributions at a time when affordability is a key issue on campuses and
among policymakers.”120 Furthermore, research institutions and universities must shoulder the increased administrative costs required to “address
the volume and nature of the additional information, with no discernable
benefits.”121 ACE advocates stress that

115

Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., Secretary DeVos Unveils Enhanced Online Portal for Higher Education Institutions to Report Foreign Gifts and Contracts (Jun. 22, 2020),
https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-unveils-enhanced-online-portal-higher-education-institutions-report-foreign-gifts-and-contracts [https://perma.cc/DHM6-D9HS].
116
Agency Information Collection Activities, Comment Requests, Foreign Gifts and Contracts Disclosures, 84 Fed. 46943 (Sept. 6, 2019).
117
Memorandum from Ted Mitchell, supra note 92.
118
Id. at 2.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 10-11.
121
Id. at 3.
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[t]he [DOE] has greatly underestimated the time it will take for institutions to comply with the vast and unnecessary expansion of the foreign gift reporting requirements. At the same time, the [DOE]’s information collection request requires such a large amount of information that it will actually undermine, as opposed to increase, the
transparency of the relationships colleges and universities have with
foreign individuals and entities, and efforts to identify nefarious conduct or inappropriate relationships. The [DOE]’s actions also risk a
chilling effect on foreign giving and the willingness of foreign entities to enter contractual agreements with colleges and universities.122

Failure to comply with section 117 can result in a criminal penalty
of up to twenty years; therefore, a mere administrative error could lead to
the indictment of U.S.-based scholars.123 In short, this sudden change in
enforcement, combined with a lack of clarity from the DOE, is overwhelming institutional administrative staff. At the same time, the ICR puts
researchers at risk of criminal fraud prosecution if staff fail to accurately
disclose pertinent information and documents.
3.
Widespread NIH and FBI Investigations
The China Initiative also emboldened the DOJ to co-opt the investigative powers of the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) and FBI to
further weed out alleged Chinese influence on U.S. research initiatives. On
August 20th, 2018, the NIH sent 18,000 letters to university administrators
asking to increase scrutiny of scientists and researchers with foreign
ties.124 While the letters themselves were vague as to the racial identity of
the scientist who should be monitored, by March 2019 some institutions
were reporting that every single researcher flagged by NIH was Chinese
or Chinese-American.125 At the 2020 World Economic Forum in Davos,
the head of Beijing’s Capital Medical University, Rao Yi, criticized the
U.S. for “institut[ing] policies specifically targeting scientists of Chinese
122

Id.
See e.g. 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 1343.
124
Gina Kolta, supra note 84; “These efforts will be supported by a working group of the Advisory
Committee to the (NIH) Director that will tap experts in academic research and security to develop
robust methods to: 1. Improve accurate reporting of all sources of research support, financial interests, and relevant affiliations; 2. Mitigate the risk to IP security while continuing NIH's long tradition
of collaborations with foreign scientists and institutions; and 3. Explore additional steps to protect
the integrity of peer review.” Letter from Francis S. Collins, Director of NIH, to Colleagues (Aug.
20, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/default/server_files/media/NIH%20Foreign %20Influence%20Letter%20to%20Grantees%2008-20-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XYB-64QX].
125
Jeffrey Mervis, NIH Letters Asking about Undisclosed Foreign Ties Rattle U.S. Univ., SCI. MAG.
(Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/03/nih-letters-asking-about-undisclosed-foreign-ties-rattle-us-universities
[https://perma.cc/H8MY-8N87].
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origin in biomedical science.”126 Rao, a former Chinese-American who
spent more than two decades studying and working in the U.S. before returning to China and withdrawing his U.S. citizenship, was outspoken in
his belief that the U.S.’ approach was hurting the global scientific landscape, expressing that “[at a] global level in science, there’s no nationalism. There [is] only Trumpism in the U.S., which is damaging international collaboration.”127
The NIH and FBI investigations target scientists and researchers
who fail to accurately complete NIH Foreign Financial Interest reports or
properly disclose their involvement in China’s “Thousand Talent Plan”
(TTP).128 The TTP is a Chinese government-run program that seeks to recruit Chinese talent, as well as foreign academics and entrepreneurs, to
work in science and technology fields in China.129 The NIH concluded that
the program, which was established in 2008, was used by the Chinese government to obtain confidential NIH grant applications and to establish socalled shadow labs in China, where NIH-funded research could be reproduced.130 NIH Foreign Financial Interest reporting, similar to reporting under HEA section 117, was scarcely enforced and sporadically regulated
until the announcement of the China Initiative in 2018.131 Even so, the NIH
used tactics such as data mining to flag cases in which scientists publicly
mentioned relationships to foreign entities that were not otherwise logged
in the NIH database.132 The 2018 NIH letters to university administrators
demanded disclosure of “all forms of other support and financial interests,

126

Éanna Kelly, Crackdown on Scientists from China is Trump-led Intimidation, SCIENCE BUSINESS
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[https://perma.cc/E8K8-5ASN].
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https://www.niaid.nih.gov/grants-contracts/compliance-foreign-grants [https://perma.cc/Z33K3D5T] (last viewed Sept. 25, 2019).
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James Jin Kang, The Thousand Talents Plan is part of China’s long quest to become the global
scientific leader, THE CONVERSATION (Aug. 31, 2020), https://theconversation.com/the-thousandtalents-plan-is-part-of-chinas-long-quest-to-become-the-global-scientific-leader145100#:~:text=The%20Thousand%20Talents%20Plan%20is% 20a%20Chinese%20government%20program%20to,%2C%20Japan%2C%20France%20and%20Australia.
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including support coming from foreign governments or other foreign entities,”133 despite much of the information being publicly available.
By February 2020, the House Committee on Oversight and Reform expressed alarm over the growing number of NIH investigations that
targeted ethnically Chinese scientists.134 In letters addressed separately to
the FBI and NIH Directors, lawmakers shared their concern that ethnically
Chinese scientists were being racially profiled while trying to work in the
U.S.135 While acknowledging the legitimate need to investigate concerns
of intellectual property theft and espionage, the House Committee highlighted evidence that the FBI was disproportionately arresting and charging Chinese-American scientists who turned out to be innocent of all
charges.136 The lawmakers further quoted the former president of the Committee of 100,137 Frank Wu, saying that he was "getting calls and emails
constantly now from ethnic Chinese–even those who are U.S. citizens–
who feel threatened” by racial profiling, discrimination, and unfair treatment by government officials.138
The U.S. has a long history of over-prosecuting innocent Chinese
“spies” for industrial, economic, and academic espionage related
charges.139 This history, combined with overbroad federal statutes criminalizing erroneous funding reports, has created the newly coined crime of
“researching while Asian.”140 The DOJ is adamant that their approach to
the China Initiative is not specifically targeting Chinese people, but rather
133

Letter from Francis S. Collins to Colleagues, supra note 124; disclosure requirements are outlined
under 42 CFR Part 50, Subpart F, Objectivity of Research. 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.604-50.605 (2016).
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Letter from Jamie Raskin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Civil Rights and Civil Liberties & Judy Chu,
Chair, Cong. Asian Pac.Am. Caucus, to Christopher Way, Dir., FBI, H.R. Comm. on Oversight and
Reform (Feb. 20, 2020),
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138
Letter from Francis S. Collins to Colleagues, supra note 124.
139
MARA HVISTENDAHL, THE SCIENTIST AND THE SPY: A TRUE STORY OF CHINA, THE FBI, AND
INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE 103, 153, 155 (Penguin Random House, 1st ed. 2020).
140
Peter Walden, Chinese Scientists Guilty of ‘Researching While Asian’ in Trump’s America,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jun. 29, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/magazines/post-magazine/long-reads/article/3016267/chinese-scientists-guilty-researching-while, [https://perma.cc/86BY3MRF].

2020]

Red Scare or Red Herring

155

is meant to target the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist
Party. However, current evidence and the prosecutorial record suggest otherwise.
B.

The China Initiative’s Effects on Researchers

1.
The Tip of the Iceberg
The “China Initiative” is hardly the first state-sponsored program
targeting Chinese people trying to work, live, or study in the U.S.141 Since
2012, federal prosecutors have implicated China, or individuals of Chinese
descent, in more than 80 percent of all cases involving actual or attempted
theft of critical economic and scientific intellectual property.142 As ethnically Chinese individuals find themselves increasingly more likely to be
arrested or charged with crimes related to espionage, they also find themselves twice as likely to have their charges dropped, be acquitted at trial,
or plead to a lesser charge before trial.143 As mentioned above, experts
acknowledge that it is possible that ethnically-Chinese scientists are
simply committing more intellectual property crimes.144 They also warn,
however, of the possibility that Chinese and other Asians are disproportionately prosecuted, and often falsely prosecuted, due to specific racial
targeting, implicit bias, or intense DOJ pressure to hold someone accountable for “[t]he long-term existential threat [posed by China] to the security
of our nation.”145 Leaders in the Asian-American scientific community do
not dispute that such crimes have occurred, nor that a need to prevent them
exists, but they argue that a blanket approach to investigating scientists
141

See e.g. Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub L. No. 47-126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882) (prohibiting all immigration of Chinese laborers); Immigration Act of 1924, Pub.L. No. 68–139, 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (prevented immigration from Asia, set quotas on the number of immigrants from the Eastern Hemisphere, and provided funding and an enforcement mechanism to carry out the longstanding ban on
other immigrants); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2013, Pub. L. No.
113-6, 127 Stat. 198 (2013) (prohibiting NASA from using any funds “to effectuate the hosting of
official Chinese visitors at facilities belonging to or utilized by NASA”).
142
Nancy Hungerford, Chinese Theft of Trade Secrets on the Rise, the US Justice Department
Warns, CNBC WORLD POLITICS (Sep. 22, 2019, 11:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/23/chinese-theft-of-trade-secrets-is-on-the-rise-us-doj-warns.html, [https://perma.cc/F89Q-SWGW].
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Id. at 754.
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Id.; quoting William Evanina, the head of U.S counterintelligence, in a press briefing in Washington, DC on February 6, 2020. Caitlin Yilek, ‘Existential threat’: US warns of Chinese espionage capabilities, WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Feb. 6, 2020 12:10 PM) https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/existential-threat-us-warns-of-chinese-espionage-capabilities
[https://perma.cc/3THY-689Z].
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who are ethnically Chinese is both disruptive and counterintuitive.146 An
anti-Chinese climate in the U.S. could cut U.S. scientists off from open
lines of academic discourse that are crucial for the ongoing exchange of
ideas that lead to innovative breakthroughs.
False allegations prior to the China Initiative proved devastating
to Chinese-American scientists who spent years building lives and prestigious careers in the United States. For example, Xiafen "Sherry" Chen, a
former hydrologist for the National Weather Service (NWS), was arrested
in 2014 for allegedly using a stolen password to download secret information about U.S. dams to be shared with Chinese officials.147 Chen’s
charges were eventually dropped in early 2015,148 but Chen later lost her
job with the NWS and found herself locked in various legal battles with
the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), the Department of Commerce, and, most recently, the U.S. government.149 Similarly, Dr.
Xiaoxing Xi, the former chairman of the Temple University physics department, was arrested at gunpoint in 2015 for allegedly sharing information with entities in China “concerning a ‘pocket heater’ belonging to
Superconductor Technologies Inc.,”150 only to have his charges dropped
by prosecutors due to inaccurate and conflicting evidence.151 Even though
the arrest failed to result in a prosecution, it cast a shadow of suspicion
over Dr. Xi, ultimately causing the suspension from his job as a professor
and the removal of his title as the chairman of the physics department.152
By rushing to arrest Chinese scientists before fully corroborating key elements of the case, federal prosecutors ruin the lives and careers of innocent
individuals.
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In 2016, the Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus
(CAPAC) wrote a letter to then Inspector General Michael Horowitz demanding “an independent investigation into whether race, ethnicity, or national origin played a part in recent cases in which Asian Americans have
been wrongfully arrested and indicted for alleged espionage.”153 Rather
than conducting an investigation, the DOJ subsequently issued a press release announcing new Department-wide implicit bias training for all of its
law enforcement agents and prosecutors.154 Since the press release, the
DOJ has been silent on the implementation or effectiveness of such training, yet the department has doubled down on its scrutiny and suspicion of
individuals of Chinese heritage.155
2.
A “Spike” in Prosecutions
In a press conference from the Center for Strategic and International Studies on February 6th, 2020, a panel of U.S. attorneys warned that
“[r]esearchers in academia and industry who work with Chinese institutions should expect a ‘spike’ in prosecutions this year as a result of a U.S.
government initiative to stop economic espionage.”156 By the end of 2020,
the DOJ boasted thousands of open investigations involving China, with
the “FBI open[ing] a new China-related counterintelligence case nearly
every 10 hours.”157 While FBI officials spoke candidly about their success
in prosecuting crimes of “academic espionage,” they failed to mention that
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most “espionage” claims were now being inferred through fraud prosecutions.158 Although the DOJ ramped up its investigations of Chinese nationals and Chinese-Americans, definitive findings of espionage against such
targets are much less tangible. By using the China Initiative to prosecute
researchers for fraudulent reporting under the HEA or NIH guidelines, the
DOJ can still remove alleged Chinese “threats” while avoiding the heavy
burden of proof required to prosecute under more rigorous laws, such as
the EEA.159 Now, experts warn that “the aggressive enforcement posture
of the China Initiative is on full display—even if the factual record contains no evidence of [actually spying for China].”160
The China Initiative’s “spike” in prosecutions now targets both
ethnically Chinese scientists and ethnically American scientists with close
ties or relationships with Chinese scientists or institutions. High profile
indictments like those of University of Kansas researcher Franklin Tao;
Emory University neuroscientist Xiao-jiang Li; or former Harvard chemistry chair Dr. Christopher Lieber exemplify the China Initiative’s widespread effect on scientific researchers.
In 2019, Feng “Franklin” Tao, an associate professor at the University of Kansas (KU) Center for Environmentally Beneficial Catalysis
(CEBC), was charged with wire fraud and program fraud under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343 and 666.161 A superseding indictment filed on January 15, 2020
alleged that Tao submitted false conflict of interest forms to KU, and thus
“obtained by fraud, property worth at least $5,000.”162 By failing to disclose an active affiliation with a Chinese university on two KU conflictof-interest forms, Tao now faces “up to 20 years in federal prison and a
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A Second Superseding indictment brings Professor Tao’s total charges to 10: 7 for wire fraud and 3
for making false statements. None of the indictments make any mention of IP theft or cooption of
protected trade secrets or scientific materials. Second Superseding Indictment at 11-14, United States
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fine up to $250,000.”163 In a motion to dismiss filed on August 14, 2020,
counsel for Tao stressed that “the government has turned a garden-variety
employment issue that is well within the jurisdiction of a Human Resources department … into a federal case involving nearly a dozen felony
charges.”164
Xiao-jiang Li, a neuroscientist and biomedical researcher at
Emory University, was also charged in 2019 with program fraud under 18
U.S.C. § 666(a)(l)(A), for “theft or bribery concerning programs receiving
[f]ederal funds.”165 Li, who had already been fired from Emory in the wake
of his investigation,166 allegedly accepted a full salary from Emory, paid
in part by federal research grants, despite spending a significant portion of
the time concurrently working in China.167 In May 2020, federal prosecutors abruptly dismissed all fraud charges against Li; instead, the former
Emory professor pled guilty to filing a false tax return and was sentenced
to one year probation.168 The DOJ was careful to point out that Li was
living “two, separate lives” but could not prove that he was engaging in
intellectual property theft or any other activities amounting to espionage.
In January 2020, Dr. Charles Lieber, chair of Harvard’s chemistry
department, was arrested on charges in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1001(a)(2), making false statements to the agency of the U.S. government.169 Later, in July 2020, the DOJ added charges of tax fraud and alleged failure to disclose a foreign bank account related to Dr. Lieber’s supposed failure to disclose his research and related income linked to
China.170 Federal prosecutors claimed that Dr. Lieber, one of the world’s
leading nanoelectronics experts, failed to divulge a $1.5 million research
partnership with China’s Wuhan University of Technology, and lied about
his involvement with the TTP.171 Dr. Lieber, who was placed on indefinite
administrative leave from Harvard, faces up to five years in prison and a
163
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$250,000 fine for the false statement claims, three years in prison and a
$100,000 fine for the false tax returns, and an additional five years in
prison and a $250,000 fine for failing to disclose his foreign bank account.172 Upon entering a plea of not guilty on all charges, counsel for Dr.
Lieber ardently maintained their client’s innocence, noting that “‘the government has this wrong’ and that ‘when justice is done, Charlie's good
name will be restored.’” 173
By indicting scientists, like those mentioned above, on allegations
of fraudulent reporting rather than economic or academic espionage (or
other more narrowly tailored crimes), the DOJ conflates their “spike” in
prosecutions with “success” in weeding out Chinese intellectual property
thieves. It is impossible to tell whether such arrests are rooted in administrative oversight or bona fide nefarious intentions. In addition, by intensifying distrust and suspicion of individuals with ties to China, the DOJ’s
actions discourage open communication between U.S. researchers and the
rest of the scientific community. At a time when scientific discovery is
becoming increasingly globalized,174 a “spike” in prosecutions of internationally connected scientists in the U.S. will likely result in a reduction to
the United States’ innovative capacity.
3.
Dismissed, Let Go, or Summarily Fired
By December 2020, the DOJ reported that more than 1,000 foreign researchers affiliated with China had left the U.S. in the wake of
China Initiative crackdowns.175 In some cases, researchers were let go at
the first sign of an investigation amidst fears of reputational harm or loss
of critical federal research funding.176 Because the NIH is the main public
funder of research in the U.S., the loss of its support would be devastating
to most institutions.
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In May 2019, neuroscientists Li Xiao-Jiang and Li Shihua were
fired from Emory University “simultaneously without any notice or opportunity…to respond to unverified accusations.”177 The two researchers,
known for their research on Huntington disease, are both U.S. citizens and
worked at Emory for over twenty-three years. The University immediately
closed the pair’s joint laboratory, shut down their websites, and ordered
four Chinese postdoctoral students working in the lab to leave the U.S.
within thirty days.178 Publicly available papers published by the Lis in
high-profile journals, as well as biographical information posted online,
have widely disclosed the couple’s Chinese funding and affiliations,179 yet
the NIH insisted that they were engaging in widespread program deception.
The MD Anderson Cancer Center in Houston, Texas similarly
ousted top epidemiologists in April 2019 after receiving NIH e-mails describing conflicts of interest or unreported foreign income by five faculty
members.180 Dr. Wu Xifeng, a naturalized U.S. citizen who had worked at
MD Anderson for twenty-seven years, was pressured to resign from her
position and has since relocated to the School of Public Health at Zhejiang
University in Hangzhou, China.181 Simultaneously, Hung Mien-Chie, a
Taiwanese-born cancer researcher, retired from his position as MD Anderson’s vice president for basic research to take a job as president of China
Medical University in Taichung, Taiwan.182 Although Hung did not publicly connect his resignation with the ongoing NIH probe, he previously
raised concerns about possible racial profiling at institutions across the
country, expressing hope that “increased security measures will not be
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used to tarnish law-abiding scientists.”183 Of the five researchers under increased scrutiny by the NIH, three were pressured to leave MD Anderson,
a fourth was removed through termination proceedings, and the fifth was
eventually cleared, but not without rumors, confusion, anxiety, and probable racial profiling. 184 The DOJ’s wholesale investigative approach is
driving talented scientists out of their jobs, out of the country, and out of
the domestic pipeline for future U.S. innovative discovery.
V.
SUGGESTIONS FOR A REFORMED APPROACH
The China Initiative is far-reaching in nature given the new powers granted to federal agencies working to counter the “nation state threats”
posed to the U.S. by China. Despite the collateral damage described above,
analysts expect the Biden Administration to continue the program, with
only a few minor changes made for good reason.185 The national security
threat posed by China is real and the interception of Chinese intellectual
property theft is important, but the Biden Administration must address the
DOJ’s indiscriminate approach with respect to non-traditional collectors.
The DOJ's use of fraud statutes to infer academic espionage means that
researchers of Chinese-descent or with ties to China are “having their lives
wrecked unnecessarily”186 regardless of nefarious intent to benefit China.
In order to achieve the goals of the China Initiative and preserve the integrity of the U.S. academic community, the DOJ and the Biden Administration should implement the following reforms to the program’s current
wholesale enforcement approach.
A.

Increase DOJ Understanding of the Nature of Scientific
Research
Advanced scientific research is an inherently public process that
relies on robust collaboration and international discourse. While privately
funded research has certainly been on the rise,187 a significant amount of
183
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research continues to occur in the public sector for the purpose of advancing greater social good.188 The sweeping nature of the DOJ’s China Initiative exposes the department’s failure to understand the “difference
between [s]cientific [r]esearch being conducted at [r]esearch …
[i]nstitutions and R&D products development taking place at private
pharmaceutical and biotech companies.”189 In a rebuke of the current
federal bureaucracy, one scientist warned that while Americans continue
to “fight among ourselves, China is getting ahead with its research
programs because its [s]cientific [r]esearchers are not distracted by the
toxic atmosphere of distrust and paranoia.”190 Chinese-American scientists
and researchers are increasingly frustrated with the ongoing scrutiny of
their ties to Chinese institutions, in part because almost all NIH-funded
research is published in publicly available scientific journals.191 Even
proprietary data destined for patent applications eventually finds its way
into the public realm: either as a published work in a scientific journal, or
later through the USPTO’s exhaustive public patent database.192
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic further exposed gaps in the
government’s understanding of the nature of scientific research. While
scientists from around the globe put all other research on hold to contain
the virus, the Trump Administration continued to tout a nationalist agenda,
ripe with terms like “biotech arms race,” and the classic, “America
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first.”193 Scientific progress in the twenty-first century relies heavily on the
efficient transmission of research results to the scientific community via
open-access platforms. During COVID-19, scientists from across the
globe, including the U.S., used public databases like bioRxiv194 to
collaborate on the creation of a vaccine or treatment.195 By April 2020,
“creative, persistent[,] and indefatigable researchers [were] working on
more than 140 experimental drug treatments and vaccines [for the virus],
cooperating across company lines and national borders.”196 At the time,
President Trump remained ardent in the U.S.’ commitment to being “first”
to produce a vaccine, but scientists stressed that “trying to sew a ‘Made in
the USA’ label onto scientific research gets complicated.”197
Academic and other scientific research, as well as the public
patent system, have historically relied on international collaboration and
robust public discourse. If it really is NIH policy to make the results and
accomplishments of the activities that it funds available to the public,198 it
seems counterintuitive that the NIH or other federal agencies would seek
to alienate students, scientists, and scholars over fear that they may be
sharing their results and accomplishments with the wrong people. While
it is clear that some publicly funded research must be protected on national
security grounds,199 the blanket approach to scrutinizing scientists with ties
to China in every discipline of publicly funded science is surely too broad,
and ultimately harmful. The DOJ would benefit from a more nuanced approach where research is categorized carefully based on actual risk to na-
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tional security. Ethnically Chinese researchers conducting NIH biomedical research or government funded environmental projects may seem like
tempting political targets at a time when U.S.-China tensions are high, but
alienating such individuals in these highly open and collaborative fields is
both futile and self-harming to the U.S.
The DOJ should end its wholesale approach to prosecuting scientists and researchers for failing to comply with foreign gift reporting statutes, especially considering that, until June 2020, the DOE offered little to
no guidance to institutions on how to effectively or accurately comply with
these statutes.200 The tracking of foreign gifts and contracts is an important
task, but inferring academic espionage from an error in reporting fails to
distinguish mere administrative oversights from bona fide threats of espionage. HEA and NIH reporting statutes are inappropriate tools for catching spies because compliance with such statutes is an administrative job
that rarely falls on the alleged spies in the first place.201 As institutions get
up to speed with new online reporting mechanisms,202 the DOJ should offer a grace period to allow good faith compliance with laws that were otherwise unregulated for more than three decades.203 In the meantime, the
DOJ should work with the scientific community to classify research areas
based on actual risk to national security.
B.

Increase Diversity, Implicit Bias, and Racial Profiling Education

The DOJ does not provide data on the demographics of current
U.S. attorneys, but 2018 diversity statistics show that just 5% of U.S, attorneys’ office employees are of Asian heritage.204 For an organization that
claims to “value diversity in [its] workforce and embrace the cultural and
demographic dimensions of our country,”205 the DOJ has categorically
fallen short of its goal to “attract and retain a workforce that represents the

200

Press Release, NAFSA, Foreign Gift and Contract Reporting (Oct. 21, 2020),
https://www.nafsa.org/regulatory-information/foreign-gift-and-contract-reporting
[https://perma.cc/6RWF-3RT4].
201
Institutional compliance with reporting requirements is typically managed through the offices of
general counsel, accounting and finance, and offices that report data directly to the Department of
Education. Id.
202
Press Release, Dep’t of Educ., supra note 115.
203
In 1995, the DOE stated in regard to HEA section 117 that “Although the statute permits the Secretary [of Education] to issue regulations concerning this reporting requirement, the Secretary has
determined that regulations are unnecessary." Press Release, NAFSA, supra note 200.
204
Workforce Size and Demographics, BEST PLACES TO WORK, https://bestplacestowork.org/rankings/ detail/DJ09#workforce [https://perma.cc/KU8E-AP75].
205
Department of Justice Diversity Management Policy Statement, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/careers/diversity-policy[https://perma.cc/33SF-8ZE5] (last updated July 11,
2014).

166

Seattle J. Tech., Envtl. & Innovation Law

[Vol. 11:1

range of personal and professional backgrounds, and experiences and perspectives that arise from differences of culture and circumstances.”206 If
nearly 95% of the U.S. attorneys responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes related to national security overwhelmingly represent just
one demographic, it is impossible to know whether their decisions to overprosecute ethnically Chinese individuals is rooted in bona fide suspicion
or implicit bias and racial profiling. Implicit bias is defined as the unconscious attitudes or stereotypes that affect our understanding, actions, and
everyday decision-making.207 Racial profiling, in the context of law enforcement, is defined as “the systematic association of sets of physical,
behavioral or psychological characteristics with particular offences and
their use as a basis for making law enforcement decisions.”208 Due to this
racial profiling and implicit bias in law enforcement, “prosecutors may be
more likely to view ambiguous evidence of guilt as conclusive when it
involves an Asian suspect because that evidence comports with their
preexisting image of Asians as spies.” 209 Prosecutors may honestly believe
evidence is stronger than it really is simply because they lack the training
necessary to identify and interrogate their implicit prejudices.
While working to diversify the field of U.S. attorneys to include
more Asian-Americans,210 the DOJ should also implement tangible
measures to adequately train current DOJ prosecutors. The DOJ was
praised in 2016 when it announced implicit bias training, 211 but the department has failed to provide information about the training’s success,
either explicitly through reported metrics or implicitly through its prosecutorial patterns. The DOJ should not only implement a more transparent
plan for addressing implicit bias and racial profiling through trainings, but
it should also ensure that such practices become a routine part of everyday
DOJ operations. The following recommendations incorporate the ideas of
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advocacy groups, scholars, and the United Nations (UN), for addressing
implicit bias and racial profiling inside the DOJ.
1.

Recommendations on Implicit Bias Training

Calls for an in-depth investigation of the DOJ’s “policies and
practices that led to [the] apparent pattern and practice of wrongful prosecutions [of Chinese-American scientists]” have gone largely unanswered
since 2016.212 In 2016, the DOJ was vocal about its newfound commitment
to implicit bias training;213 yet, without follow-up programs or reporting,
there is no way to know whether the DOJ is progressing toward those declared goals. Implicit bias training is evidently not a cure-all for wrongful
prosecutions based on race, ethnicity, or national origin, but “the trainings
themselves are still valuable as a palatable entryway into discussing disparities and the need for reform.”214 In order to address racial disparities
within the DOJ while also easing the anxiety of the Asian-American scientific community, the DOJ should be transparent about how implicit bias
training is implemented, tracked, and reviewed inside the department.
Effective implicit bias training is a vigorous process that requires
“more than just a few hours in a classroom.”215 Experts compare reducing
implicit bias over a period of time to breaking a bad habit, a process that
first requires awareness of one’s prejudice; then a desire to reduce it, an
understanding of the times and places in which one’s prejudice operates;
and finally, an understanding of how to consistently use tools that help
replace biased responses with egalitarian responses.216 For an implicit bias
training program to be successful, Professor Patricia Devine and her colleagues recommend coaching individuals on five key strategies for reducing implicit bias,217 then continuing to follow up with bias trainees on a
212
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regular basis.218 Generally, “implicit bias training should provide exercises
that help [trainees] experience the emotions associated with being on the
receiving end of negative or positive biases,”219 and develop tools and
skills to respond in a more inclusive way. Ultimately, to measure the effectiveness of such training, an organization can define and track specific
measurable outcomes over time related to the training’s specific goals.220
Here, the most obvious measurable sign of success would be a reduction
in the number of false charges brought against Chinese-Americans, indicating that the DOJ has shifted its view of Asian-Americans from one of
implied suspicion to unambiguous neutrality.
2.

Recommendations on Preventing and Countering Racial Profiling
The UN describes racial profiling as “incompatible with the protection of human rights [yet] found in practice among police, customs, immigration and national security agencies. It is often manifested in the context of …targeting for surveillance or immigration decisions carried out
by such agencies.”221 In the U.S., "driving while black" is an ironic name
given to the racial profiling of African American drivers, implying that a
police officer will pull over an African American motorist largely because
of racial profiling rather than any visible violation of traffic law.222 “Researching while Asian,” as mentioned above,223 similarly scoffs at the
DOJ’s history of profiling Asian-Americans as spies.
The UN Department of Global Communications and the Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights recommend that every member
state develop a legal framework to prohibit racial discrimination and the
practice of racial profiling.224 The High Commissioner for Human Rights
(2) Counter-stereotypic imaging: The participant practices imagining positive exemplars of individuals of stereotyped demographics. (3) Individuation: The participant obtains specific details about a
person so that they can be evaluated as a person as opposed to a member of a group. (4) Perspective
Taking: The participant envisioning himself as a member of a stereotyped group considers how she
might think, feel, etc. (5) Increasing opportunities for contact: The participant seeks opportunities to
encounter and engage in positive interactions with out-group members. Devine et al., supra note
216, at 1270-71.
218
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also suggests that countries draft “formal and explicit guidelines that specifically prohibit ethnic or racial profiling and are intended to help [law
enforcement] make suspicion-led [as opposed to racially-motivated] decisions.”225 Other recommendations for reducing racial profiling include
community engagement, raising awareness, diverse recruitment, and detailed data collection to be used to measure departmental accountability.226
In 2017, representative John Conyers Jr. of Michigan introduced the End Racial Profiling Act to the 115th Congress. The bill had
the potential to fulfill the above-mentioned UN recommendations.227 After
passing through various house subcommittees and securing eighty-one cosponsors; however, the House never voted on the bill and it was never
enacted.228 Legislation like the End Racial Profiling Act of 2017 could
dramatically transform the DOJ while also providing peace of mind and
tangible solutions to communities of color, including Asian Americans.
Representative Conyers’s bill should be reintroduced, and Congress
should enact the End Racial Profiling Act as an initial step towards
“[b]uilding bridges, solidarity and connecting efforts across Asian and
non-Asian communities…to achiev[e] a collective vision for social justice.”229
VI.
CONCLUSION
The China Initiative is a sweeping federal plan aimed at satisfying
the DOJ’s strategic priority of countering the national security threat posed
by China. The Initiative is designed, in part, to protect the United States’
status as a leader in global innovation and scientific discourse. The DOJ’s
enforcement approach to “non-traditional collectors,” meant to protect the
United States’ innovative advantage, is unnecessarily over-broad and thus
tends to stifle innovation by exacerbating existing issues of racial animus
and creating even more uncertainty for U.S.-based researchers and institutions.
The U.S. is justified in its concern that China may be using unfair
practices to achieve economic prominence. Nevertheless, the current approach to enforcing the China Initiative is hurting rather than helping the
225
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U.S. in its efforts remain a hub for scientific discovery, technological
growth, and academic discourse. While the China Initiative’s sweeping
enforcement measures may succeed in stopping some intellectual property
theft and producing high-profile convictions, they also incite anxiety, fear,
and confusion at universities and research institutes across the country.
Chinese students, who comprise the largest cohort of international enrollees at American universities, are alienated by the increasingly suspicious
and hostile environment for aspiring academics of Asian heritage. University administrators are paralyzed by the possibility that an administrative
error may lead to the imprisonment of a respected colleague. Scientists and
researchers—marred by investigations, arrests, and removals—are ostensibly driven out of their jobs, out of the country, and out of the domestic
pipeline for future U.S.-based innovative discovery.
The national security threat posed by China is real and the interception of Chinese intellectual property theft is important, but the Biden
Administration must develop a more nuanced enforcement approach with
respect to non-traditional collectors. First, the DOJ should stop using administrative reporting statutes as a basis to prosecute academic espionage
across all fields of U.S.-based academic discourse. Instead, the DOJ
should increase its understanding of the nature of scientific research in order to more carefully categorize research fields based on actual risk to
national security. Ethnically Chinese researchers conducting NIH biomedical research or government funded environmental projects may seem like
tempting political targets, but alienating such individuals in highly open
and collaborative fields is both futile and self-harming to the U.S. Ultimately, the DOJ should diversify the field of U.S. attorneys responsible
for bringing charges under the China Initiative. By introducing new perspectives, the DOJ improves its chances of prosecuting individuals based
on bona fide suspicion rather than implicit bias and racial profiling. In the
meantime, the DOJ should begin by implementing implicit bias training
as well as measures to prevent and counter racial profiling within the department. As the United States seeks to protect and expand its innovative
capacity in years to come, it requires a more nuanced approach to dealing
with threats and rivals.

